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Constructing New Retirement Systems:
Choosing between Insurance and Investment, Choice and Default
Abstract
Retirement 20/20 is the Society of Actuaries initiative to find new retirement systems
(focusing on tier II) that meet the needs of stakeholders better than the existing DB/DC
models. The first steps in the initiative were to identify characteristics of a successful new
retirement system, by identifying the needs and risks of stakeholders in the system. What
has emerged is an understanding of the tension that exists today between investment and
insurance, choice and default (including how choices are structured). In addition, the
Retirement 20/20 initiative has constructed a Measurement Framework that can be used
to analyze how well plan designs meet the needs and risks of stakeholders in the system;
in the analysis of several plans, we have brought out other features that lead to successful
retirement systems. This paper summarizes what we’ve learned to date about the balance
between investment and insurance, choice and default, highlight roles for stakeholders
and suggest new ways of bringing people together to prepare for their retirement.
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Constructing New Retirement Systems:
Choosing between Insurance and Investment, Choice and Default
Introduction
Retirement 20/20 (R20/20) is a strategic initiative of the Society of Actuaries to develop
new retirement designs. R20/20 systematically explores new ideas for retirement systems that go
beyond the existing defined benefit (DB) or defined contribution (DC) framework. During the
20th century, many employers established private pension plans; initially pensions were of the
DB type. DB plans are a form of insurance for individuals, paying fixed benefits over a lifetime
once the individual retires. Their primary forms of payment have guarantees of amount and
guarantees to pay as long as, but only as long as, the individual (and potentially the individual’s
beneficiary) lives. Covered employees have many guarantees, but few choices. The last few
decades of the 20th century saw a decline in the DB plan as private employers moved to DC
plans. DC plans promise a fixed contribution which goes into an account which (usually)
accumulates with investment earnings. This fund accumulates wealth which can then be used to
meet retirement needs. R20/20 seeks to discover new designs that could move beyond the
DB/DC paradigm. More details about R20/20, and an overview of the work to date, are found in
Appendix I.
R20/20’s analysis has focused on analyzing the needs, risks and roles of stakeholders in
the system, and exploring key themes that emerged early in the process (e.g. aligning roles with
skills, inclusion of self-adjusting mechanisms). As R20/20 participants have worked through the
needs and risks facing the stakeholders in the retirement system, we’ve discovered that there is a
key tension as to whether private retirement wealth (outside of social insurance) should be in the
form of insurance or investment wealth. In addition, another key tension is the degree to which
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stakeholders, particularly individuals, ought to have choices (e.g. whether their retirement wealth
is primarily insurance or investment, how much wealth is accumulated, how that wealth is
converted to income in retirement and whether payment streams are annuitized). These tensions
arise because of competing needs and risks of the primary stakeholders: society, individuals,
employers and markets.
Individuals. Individuals’ preferences may vary over their lifecycle, and the presence of
either a one-size-fits-all DB or DC model may not accommodate such dynamic preferences.
Individuals are poor at retirement planning and make poor choices, the consequences of which
(inadequate retirement wealth, outliving retirement assets) are not realized until the individual is
older and poor outcomes may not be remedied easily.
Society. Society (current and future generations of taxpayers) has an interest in
retirement stability, defined as the greatest number of individuals being able to support
themselves in retirement with least reliance on social insurance and welfare. Future taxpayers
prefer that retirees have as much private wealth accumulated so they do not have to transfer as
much income directly to retirees in the form of increased social insurance or welfare benefits.
Society also wants its elderly population to have a certain minimum level of support. Society
needs strong defaults, to protect future taxpayers against the negative consequences of bad
choices made today.
Employers. While society has, to date, granted employers the decision as to whether
employees accumulate retirement wealth as investment or insurance, employers’ choices are
driven by what best serves their core business operations. Employers find that employees want
pension benefits, but are generally indifferent as to the form. Younger employees were less
likely to prefer defined benefit plans, although plan preferences vary by employment type 1
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(AAA/SOA 2004). As such, the employer then focuses on the drawbacks it associates with
sponsoring insurance (DB) plans (e.g. volatility of contributions and accounting costs,
assumption of long-term liabilities, administrative costs, and fiduciary risk).
Markets. Within R20/20, markets were originally defined as the capital markets within
which retirement wealth is accumulated and de-accumulated. While the capital markets are an
important tool of the system, markets aren’t a stakeholder in the system’s success, per se. Using
markets wisely, however, through transparency and proper pricing of risk, is key to the success
of any retirement system. As such, R20/20 considers markets as a stakeholder in its analysis.
The Society of Actuaries has also developed a tool to consider how well the needs and
risks of stakeholders are met by any particular retirement model. This tool, called the
Measurement Framework, outlines 34 criteria for the four stakeholders which determine how
well any particular system meets retirement needs. The criteria allow a more nuanced evaluation
of a plan that goes beyond the insurance/investment and choice/default framework.
To date we’ve analyzed three existing systems that differ from the corporate DB/DC
model. From the Measurement Framework we’ve identified other features to consider in
creating a successful retirement system: strong governance framework, alignment of roles with
skills, presence of self-adjusting mechanisms (that share risk among stakeholders), solidarity
among plan participants, use of groups, a degree of independence from employer, and use of
nearly default free discount rates for measurement.
What we’ve learned from R20/20 is that we need to consciously balance setting the line
between investment and insurance, and how we think about choices versus defaults (including
how we structure choices and set defaults), and how we design systems with the other key
features . Our understanding of needs, risks and roles of key stakeholders in the system must
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govern how we design new systems. What we have today is a system which has been hampered
by regulation. What is needed is for the system to evolve to permit new ways of thinking about
how to achieve this balance.
Investment vs. Insurance
One key differentiation is whether the goal of the Tier II retirement system is to insure
against the economic risks of retirement or accumulate wealth to meet economic needs in
retirement. While both of these require the same thing – an accumulation of wealth during the
working years – they are very different in terms of what guarantees they bring, what choice (or
lack thereof) they offer, how they use the markets, and how they accommodate individual
situations. Stakeholders in the retirement system have different points of view as to whether
wealth or insurance is the key need.
Society focuses on ensuring that most individuals have sufficient retirement security.
Generations with (overall) inadequate retirement income will increase pressure to raise social
insurance benefits, increasing the direct transfer of wealth from workers to retirees. Society is
also at risk with greater variation in the level of retirement income; to the extent that the
dispersion of private wealth increases (more people reach retirement with less than adequate or
more than adequate income) society faces unpleasant choices. Individuals with less than
adequate income may press for an overall increase in social insurance benefits or may draw more
welfare benefits. Government can finance these benefits by increasing taxes on retirees with
more wealth, but this is complicated and politically dangerous (objections might be raised both
from retirees, who see their wealth at stake, and workers, who see their potential future wealth at
stake).
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R20/20 participants noted that while society favors insurance, it favors a degree of
insurance such that individuals’ needs are met and future taxpayers are not burdened by
excessive cost or risk. The consensus is that a degree of annuitization is important, and it may be
important for society to mandate or encourage (e.g. through tax policy) annuitization in addition
to what Social Security provides. This conclusion that a degree of, but not necessarily full,
annuitization is valuable is supported by other research (Dushi and Webb, 2004).
Insurance arrangements do a better job of meeting the retirement needs and risk
preferences of individuals. The Measurement Framework includes eleven individual criteria, six
of which are met by insurance forms of payment (guaranteed income, predictability of income,
sensitive to family needs, requirement for individual skills, investment risk, and longevity risk).
Three others (sensitivity to employment conditions, inflation risk and premature retirement risk)
can be met by either insurance or wealth measures. Only two (retirement flexibility and
portability) are difficult to meet within the existing insurance structures (although insurance
structures could be redesigned better to meet those needs). The individual criteria are discussed
further in the section on the Measurement Framework.
Individual preferences for investment type vehicles, particularly while they are younger,
may reflect the preference for portability and for flexibility in timing and manner of retirement
distributions. Portability has been seen as a strong feature in the DC system, even though that
portability has been shown to create leakage (retirement assets being cashed out on job transfer)
(Munnell and Sundén, 2006). Knowledge workers in particular are phasing into retirement, often
by combining work with retirement as they reach their 50s and 60s (sometimes by choice and
sometimes due to labor market conditions or a need to care for parents/spouse). One challenge
for future insurance models is to accommodate better portability and flexibility of payment.
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Portability is perceived to be important while individuals are many years from retirement.
Portability is more important among younger workers and younger retirees than older workers or
older retirees (AAA/SOA 2004). Retirees have stronger preference than workers for guaranteed
income streams, regardless of whether they are through a defined benefit or defined contribution
arrangement (AAA/SOA 2004).
While individuals need insurance protection, there are several factors which keep
individuals from voluntarily seeking it. Individuals prefer to maintain levels of wealth as a
cushion against health shocks, including the potential need for care (in home or institutional) as
individuals age; individuals also prefer wealth for bequest motives (Ameriks et al, 2008).
Finally, individuals tend to underestimate their own life expectancy (Society of Actuaries, 2005).
Annuitization can have other benefits; individuals with more of their wealth annuitized tend to
consume less than individuals with less of their wealth committed to lifetime income (Butrica
and Mermin, 2006) which may mean that annuitization can help individuals with less wealth
manage that wealth better through retirement. Focus group participants only considered a few
years ahead in their planning horizon (possibly decreasing the value they saw in annuitization);
they also, however, reported deciding whether they could afford to retire by comparing monthly
expenses with monthly income (Greenwald et al 2006).
If we consider the view of the markets or of employers on whether benefits take the form
of investment or insurance, these stakeholders are indifferent. As noted earlier, employers
generally prefer sponsoring plans DC (investment) plans rather than DB (insurance) plans, but
this is because of the risk that sponsorship places on employers. If we consider the needs of
employers (managing workforce, supporting primary business purpose, responsive to owners)
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and risks they face (business risk, regulatory risk, fiduciary risk and litigation risk), in theory,
there should be no preference for an insurance or investment model.
Traditionally, DB plans (insurance) have been valued by employers for their ability to
attract, retain and retire workers effectively. However, for many employers, these features have
been overshadowed by the associated risk associated with DB plan sponsorship. If an employer
wants an insurance vehicle (DB plan), the employer essentially establishes a captive annuity
writer. Shareholders (business owners) may prefer that managers not take risk outside the core
business. In addition, the employer (as plan sponsor) must meet complex funding and
accounting rules, and operational requirements for everything from notices on benefit payment to
restrictions on payments to highly compensated employees. The investment model has been
friendlier to the manager: the manager retains the ability to adjust contributions, cash cost equals
accounting cost, and there is no balance sheet impact; the investment model presents less risk to
company operations. If the employer’s role did not require it to sponsor the investment or
insurance arrangement, the employer should be indifferent between the models (and might prefer
insurance models if they provide an advantage in attraction, retention and retirement).
From the markets’ point of view, retirement assets are invested in the markets whether
they are in an investment or insurance form. Today, we associate the insurance form with
insurers, who invest primarily in risk-free assets. DB plans, however, invest in both risk-free and
risky assets (equities), and the typical lifecycle DC fund holds some portion of investments in
risky assets. There is a debate that retirement systems operate more efficiently by investing in
risky assets, because the long horizon of the typical DB plan allows investors to ride through
market declines (cite); similarly lifecycle theory states that individuals can invest in risky assets
because when participants are younger, they have more tolerance for risk (cite) (and they can
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weather market downturns). Others have argued to the contrary; that over the long time horizon
equities become more risky (Bodie, 1995). R20/20 participants have not settled on whether
retirement systems should invest savings (in the investment or insurance form) in only risk-free
assets or risk-free and risky assets; the choice of market investments is part of the construction of
models.
Market Innovation and the Cost of Insurance. One theme that has emerged from R20/20
is how to use the markets better in insurance arrangements: do we have the right market
instruments to drive down the cost of insurance arrangements?
In the 20th century, many individuals derived their non-Social Security income through
employer sponsored DB plans. While these plans were never universal, they provide a
significant source of retirement income, particularly at the middle and upper income tiers (Reno
and Lavery, 2007). Plan sponsors have hedged many risks of retirement, including investment
returns and cohort mortality risk2, by charging current or future shareholders (corporate plans) or
taxpayers (public plans) the cost of any losses.
If the system is to change, and we are to move away from the employer (as sponsor)
guarantee yet retain the insurance guarantee within the plan, then more hedging may be required.
(Self-adjusting mechanisms are one way to allow the plan to continue to take investment risk by
sharing that risk with participants; these mechanisms are discussed in the Measurement
Framework section.)
One question that has emerged is whether such hedging requires new market instruments.
Can we design new retirement systems if these instruments are not yet available? The
conclusion has been that we probably have to design the system first and go to the market to
demand the new instruments. And, in turn, there has to be sufficient demand (e.g. higher levels
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of annuitization than seen today) for the market to be able to create the hedging instruments. If
you consider the chicken-and-egg dilemma of creating the market instruments first to encourage
the insurance instruments or creating the insurance instruments (with strong demand) and then
asking the markets to respond with hedging instruments, it is the latter path that R20/20
participants believe will be successful. The market can only react to strong, well-defined
institutional demand. Creating more demand for annuities will allow us to bring the price down
by creating the demand for hedging instruments to spread the risk of annuitization to the wider
capital markets. In reality there may be a ratcheting effect (demand for annuities creates
demand for instruments which creates more insurance products).
Choice vs. Default
The issue of choice covers several concepts: the degree of choice within the system, how
choices are framed, whether certain choices are encouraged or discouraged (through framing or
other incentives) and who pays the penalty if bad choices are made. To the extent there are no
choices, what is the default? And within a choice scenario, how is the default selected? Any
system with choice requires strong defaults; retirement systems with choice function better with
strong defaults (Choi et al. 2005).
Choice is costly. The lowest-cost risk-pooling option is to gather a large number of
people and give them the exact same benefit. The pool benefits from no anti-selection (people
electing to be or not be in the pool based on their individual understanding of their risk) and
similarity of benefits drives down administrative cost. In the purest example of choice between
cost and wealth – the private annuity market – we find that the cost of private market annuity
sales to individuals is higher due to anti-selection on the part of the consumer (Finkelstein and
Poterba 2002).
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Society is mostly indifferent between choice and default, but, where choice produces bad
outcomes for society, or where choice increases the cost of the system (taking money away from
other social goals), society may prefer defaults. And similarly, to the extent that choice produces
increased disparity in wealth levels, implying likely rebalancing through unpopular taxation,
some level of default may be preferred. Society may prefer to structure choices, through tax
incentives or penalties, to ensure future taxpayers are defended against bad choices.
Individuals say they want choice (all other things being equal), as noted earlier in the
investment section, they often cannot use that choice effectively. Studies on 401(k) plans have
shown that left to their own actions, even with good education, participants don’t always act in
their own best interests (Karlsson, Massa, and Simonov 2007; Choi et al. 2005). The retirement
planning process is psychologically uncomfortable because it is a reminder of pending decline
and future death (Weber 2004). Structured choices and strong defaults help individuals make
better choices, and keep individuals from having to make uncomfortable decisions. The extent to
which choices are offered, incentivized or penalized depends on how the system weighs the
desire of individuals for choice against the needs of society.
Retirement Signals. R20/20 participants have discussed retirement signals, particularly
signals sent regarding retirement age and the retirement process. One of the first themes to
emerge out of R20/20 was support for new norms for work and retirement: changing retirement
from an event to a process, and eliminating the idea of the “right” age at which everyone ought
to retire. Some R20/20 participants focused on removing existing signals that encourage early
retirement. Other participants expressed concerns that not all workers could work to later
retirement ages. The consensus that emerged was that new retirement systems ought to be
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neutral regarding retirement ages, and to set up systems that allow workers to treat retirement as
a process, rather than an event.
At our most recent R20/20 conference, attendees discussed how retirement age within
social insurance (Social Security in the US), serves as an important signal. Participants also
discussed how Social Security benefits are presented. For example, if choices between early and
normal retirement are presented with a break-even age, this presentation tilts participants to take
early retirement. If benefits are shown based on the increased monthly payments at later
retirement ages, this could tilt participants toward taking later retirement. The choice of how to
retire, (all at once or in stages), and when, is a choice that must be framed. If the tier II
retirement system does not send any signals for retirement age (it is retirement age neutral)
participants will find signals from other sources. The most likely source will be the social
insurance system. R20/20 participants continue to consider how retirement age signals should be
designed. .
Employers are largely indifferent to the degree of choice individuals have within the
system. However, employers are not indifferent to their own choices. Employer choice within
the retirement system today is very limited: most private employers can choose only to sponsor a
single-employer DB or a single-employer DC plan. Sponsorship of a plan (even a DC plan)
brings a host of regulatory, legal and fiduciary risks. Most private employers who do not
sponsor a plan are unable to offer retirement benefits to their employees. Employers with
unionized employees can choose to have those employees belong to a multi-employer plan, but
those plans bring risk to employers as well (exiting from a multi-employer plan can be
expensive).
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R20/20 has focused on providing a wide range of options for the employer’s role.
Choices need to be included to allow employers to have a role in education, in offering
employees access to a plan or to a range of third-party plans, in providing funding toward thirdparty plans, or in sponsoring and funding their own plan. Adding more opportunities for
employers to provide access to benefits (without having to sponsor plans) could lead to higher
coverage in plans by individuals. In addition, employers may agree to partially fund benefits
(defer compensation) is they can do so without facing the fiduciary, administrative and
regulatory risk of plan sponsorship. The cost of entry into the system would be lowered, which
could increase coverage of individuals.
University and other select not-for-profit employers, for example, can elect to provide
access and funding to the TIAA-CREF plan without bearing administrative costs, fiduciary risk
or investment risk. From the employer’s standpoint, TIAA-CREF acts like a DC plan: once the
contribution has been paid, the plan is fully responsible for the benefits. From the participant’s
standpoint, the TIAA annuity acts like a variable annuity; while annuity payments vary based on
fund performance, the annuity provides protection against outliving assets.3
In the Netherlands, there are industry wide plans, often organized by union or industry,
where the employers participate in the fund but bear no responsibility for the fund operation.
The plans are structured a bit differently in that future contribution levels can vary based on fund
performance, but there are mechanisms to modify retirement benefits as well. R20/20
participants suggest that other employers could be given the option to participate in similar plans,
where the employer’s responsibility ends once the contribution for that year’s benefit has been
made. Third party non-employer plan sponsors are discussed in the Measurement Framework
section.
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Choice, to markets, represents innovation. To the degree that all benefits are
standardized and mandated, markets are unable to respond and innovate. When R20/20
participants discussed how markets look at default options, they focused on a need for a balance
between innovation and standardization.
There may need to be some degree of standardization, for example of simple annuity
products (life annuities and deferred life annuities, aka longevity insurance), to give individuals
clear and comparable choices among annuity providers. A degree of standardization helps
consumers understand the benefits and compare price and quality between insurers for these
standardized products. Introduction of standardized products should also decrease cost, by
making price comparisons easier (driving competition), but also by increasing market share
(consumers may look first to standardized products, and may be more willing to purchase if they
understand product differences). One benefit of increasing market share would be to drive down
the anti-selection, which would greatly reduce cost; the closer the market can come to a
compulsory market, the lower the cost to annuitants. A study of the UK annuity market showed
that compulsory annuities were considerably less expensive than voluntary annuities, with the
difference driven largely by anti-selection in the voluntary market (Finkelstein and Poterba,
2002). The increased market share could then further drive down cost by driving demand for
market based hedges for insurers and others issuing the products.
R20/20 participants recognized that too much standardization drives out innovation;
insurers and other financial service companies should continue to be able to develop innovative
insurance and investment products. Many wealthy retirees use existing annuity products to
structure income, protect against adverse consequences and satisfy bequest needs. Continued
innovation in the annuity market can also benefit retirees with lower levels of wealth, as products
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that were designed for the wealthy, for example, may find a market among less wealthy
consumers. Retirement 20/20 participants believe market innovation is one key to the success of
the retirement system.
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Measurement Framework
SOA volunteers and staff have developed the Measurement Framework (SOA 2009a,
forthcoming) as a way of evaluating new retirement systems. The Measurement Framework
takes the point of view of the four stakeholders and considers for each stakeholder what criteria
they consider key in a retirement system. It develops a simple rating of how well the design
being analyzed meets each criterion, and considers how well it meets it in the presence of moral
hazard. It also separately tests four new concepts that bridge stakeholders: self-adjusting
mechanisms, new norms for work and retirement, aligning roles with skills and alignment with
markets. A complete description of the Measurement Framework tool is found in Appendix II.
The Measurement Framework was developed to help us understand what retirement
system design features best met the needs of stakeholders within the system. It allows a
systematic comparison of new designs. The stakeholder criteria are provided in Tables I-IV. .
Five plans have been evaluated in the Measurement Framework: single-employer
corporate final pay DB, single-employer corporate DC (401(k)), Ontario Teachers Pension Plan
(OTPP), Dutch industry wide schemes, and the Clergy Retirement Security Program (DB) of the
United Methodist Church (UMC plan) (which was chosen as an example of a church plan). The
latter three plans will be collectively referred to as “non-traditional plans” because they fall
outside the corporate sponsored DB/DC framework. The non-traditional plans all provide
participants a DB type benefit, but otherwise differ in terms of how risk and responsibility is
shared. A brief description of each plan is found in Appendix III. We have studied them as case
studies for other ways of operating a retirement system.4 The preliminary analysis of these nontraditional plans have highlighted some principles for successful retirement design: strong
governance framework, alignment of roles with skills, presence of self-adjusting mechanisms
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(that share risk among stakeholders), solidarity among plan participants, a degree of
independence from employer, use of groups, and use of nearly default free discount rates for
measurement. Some of these principles (strong governance) are well-understood and some are
still being evaluated (self-adjusting mechanisms) for their potential usefulness. And, some of
these principles may not be usable outside of the non-traditional plan.
Strong Governance. Plans with robust, transparent, and well-understood governance
structures work well. Each of the non-traditional designs has a degree of independence from the
organizations that fund the plans; partly because of this degree of independence they have a
robust governance structure to ensure the plan functions properly. Key features for these nontraditional plans include:


Independent boards made up, in whole or in part, of retirement and investment experts. The
OTPP Board has eight members plus a chair, all of whom are retirement professionals (the
Ontario Teacher’s Federation may appoint one teacher to the Board).



Board members may be chosen by employers or employees but they do not act as
representatives of the employer or employee. Typically they have professional experience
in pensions and investments.



Plans have pre-set rules about how to change contributions or benefit levels (some plans
have pre- or post-retirement inflation indexation). The Dutch industry wide plans have a
“policy ladder” which predetermines how contributions and benefit indexation are affected
by funding levels in the plan.



The Board sets the contribution rates and those funding the plan must pay their share of the
cost; contribution rates are not negotiable.



The Board sets benefit levels that are common for all members.
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Where members are union members, benefits are not subject to negotiation (benefit levels
are set by the Board, on which the union has representation).
Strong governance implies a strong role for society (government) in its role as regulator.

Note that strong governance does not require strong government regulation; in some cases the
plans with strong governance exist because there is less government regulation upon the plan
and the plan sponsor has taken the responsibility to ensure that its own governance structure is
strong. One could argue that too many rules and regulations create a situation where the plan is
so busy “following the rules” that it cannot focus on proper governance. Successful retirement
systems need strong governance, particularly if these systems are not sponsored by a single
employer for a single employee group.
Alignment of Roles with Skill. Within the Measurement Framework tool, plans that
allocate roles away from individuals and employers, in particular, score better. Key features for
these non-traditional plans include:


Use of professional investment advisors to make investment decisions (individuals do not
make investment choices).



Independence from the employers of the plan participants. In particular, the plans have an
independent board, comprised mostly, if not solely, with retirement and investment
professionals who act on behalf of the plan, rather than the plan sponsor (cutting
contributions to meet budget needs) or plan participants (raising benefits, particularly in
unionized situations).



Establishment of an independent board with full authority to levy contributions from
participants and their employers.
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Offering limited choices to participants structured around traditional annuities (these plans
do not offer lump sums except small amounts at termination).
Presence of self-adjusting mechanisms. Self-adjusting mechanisms permit the plan to

adjust benefits (including benefits paid to retirees) and contributions based on plan experience.
These mechanisms can also be seen as risk sharing mechanisms. One criticism of the DB and
DC plans is that by focusing solely on the insurance or investment model, they put all risk to
one party (employer sponsors for DB, participant for DC) and none to the other (participant for
DB, employer sponsor for DC). A more robust system would share risks. This however
requires a new way of thinking about the promise of the benefit that would permit changes in
benefit amounts. Examples of self adjusting mechanisms in these non-traditional plans include:


The Dutch industry wide plan formulae are generally career-pay based benefits. Benefits
are indexed pre-retirement and post-retirement with inflation. However, both pre- and postretirement indexation is conditional on plan performance. In this case, if the plan has
negative experience, not only do contributions increase, but expected inflationary increases
can be foregone.



The OTPP has recently introduced conditional inflation indexing for its retirees. This will
take twenty years to phase in fully, but eventually, post-retirement indexation for retirees
will also be conditional on fund performance.
The idea of self-adjusting mechanisms is they allow the plan to continue to take risk

(particularly investment risk); if equities outperform risk-free assets, the participants are able to
earn higher benefits for lower contributions. Self-adjusting mechanisms are often designed
using ALM models and Monte Carlo type scenarios of market performance given a typical asset
mix. Models by definition are limited, and the 2008/2009 liquidity crisis is just one example of
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how market events can be more devastating than what can be predicted by typical capital market
scenarios. Moreover, steep declines in markets can lead to less available cash for pension
funding and higher unemployment, leading to more forced early retirement. These cascading
scenarios are outside the ability of computer models to handle. Third parties report that De
Nederlandsche Bank has recently acknowledged that existing risk management instruments in
the Dutch industry-wide plans are less effective than originally thought (Preesman, 18 March
2009). If self-adjusting mechanisms are not sufficiently robust to withstand market corrections,
they may not represent strong retirement design feature.
We are also not sure that self-adjusting mechanisms within an industry collective plan
could withstand the decline of that industry (e.g. steel manufacturing in the US). As an industry
declines, and more workers are forced into retirement, there would be less money available for
cash contributions, more retirees in the fund (than active workers) and possibly more workers
entering retirement sooner than might have been predicted. These plans would at the very least
have to shift their expectations over time to focus more on lower levels of securitized benefits
and may be able to take fewer risks than when originally designed.
Finally, there are fundamental economic questions as to whether it is better to hedge
these risks in the market rather than share them with plan participants. The erosion of
purchasing power through inflation can erode the insurance protections of retirement benefits,
suggesting that this risk ought not to be subject to adjustments for plan performance.
At the 2008 R20/20 conference, participants raised concerns that the willingness of
employed participants to take on risk may be very different than the willingness of retirees to
take on those same risks; it may be better if these funds are bifurcated so that retiree benefits
(and the benefits of those approaching retirement) are securitized while benefits for working
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employees might be subject to more investment risk. This may lower the eventual benefits that
can be provided, but would provide greater security and better risk management..
Solidarity among members. These non-traditional plans have strong solidarity among
members, as evidenced by the following features:


Both the OTPP and UMC plans are organized around a particular profession (teachers and
clergy, respectively). All members of the profession within a large geographic area (Ontario
and the US, respectively) are automatically in the plan, and if they change employers (within
that profession/geographic area) they remain members of the plan. The organization can
also be by union groups.



Plans may require significant employee contributions. The OTPP requires employees to
contribute half of cost of the plan annually (the other half is contributed mostly by the
Government of Ontario with minor contributions from other employers in the system). For
2009, employee contributions are 10.4% up to the Canadian Pension Plan (CPP) Maximum
Pensionable Earnings limit ($CN 46,300) and 12.0% over the CPP limit; employer
contributions are equal to employee contributions (OTPP 2008).



Plans adjust contributions or benefits based on fund performance. Adjusting benefits and
contributions for members ties members into the performance of the fund, and gives
members a share in the stake of how well the plan is managed (as opposed to having a third
party – the employer – be solely responsible for plan management).
One concern about the effectiveness of solidarity is the extent to which demographic

shifts (plan population aging) can affect the ability of the plan to maintain solidarity. As noted
earlier, plans with an aging membership or in a declining industry may have difficulty
maintaining solidarity among plan members. Solidarity may also be tested by extreme
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conditions; the Dutch industry wide plans are starting to see strains in solidarity, with unions
insisting benefits cannot be significantly reduced (Preesman 16 February 2009) and retiree
organizations calling for a rescue fund for retirees (Preesman 13 March 2009). These nontraditional plans also have high natural internal cohesiveness among participants (teachers
within a union, clergy within a denomination, and Dutch citizens (within a particularly industry
or union)); it is not known to what extent the internal cohesiveness must already exist to get the
benefits from solidarity.
A degree of independence from the employer. These non-traditional plans have a
sponsor who is not the individual employer who is funding the plan. The OTPP is jointly
sponsored by the Ontario Ministry of Education and the Ontario Teacher’s Federation, making it
separate from the independent school boards that employ the teachers covered by the plan. The
Dutch industry wide schemes are independent of the employers whose employees participate in
the plan. The UMC plan is sponsored by the United Methodist Church and not by the
individual parishes.
US multi-employer plans are not sponsored by a single employer, but rather by a group
of employers on behalf of their unionized workforce (generally members of specific unions).
Multi-employer plans work differently than these non-traditional plans because the participating
employers remain responsible for plan underfunding; an employer that wishes to leave the plan
must pay a one-time charge for any underfunding at the time of the plan withdrawal (GAO
2004). The employers are interdependent on each other for the economic health for the health
of the plan (GAO 2004), which may make an employer reluctant to be the “last large employer
standing” in a weak (underfunded) multi-employer plan.
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In these non-traditional plans, the employers are, not strictly speaking, responsible for
any plan underfunding (although they will likely be charged higher contribution rates should the
plan become underfunded). While some may argue this is a weak distinction, we have seen that
these non-traditional plans also have stronger governance models and self-adjusting
mechanisms that adjust both contributions and benefits.
Use of groups. All teachers in Ontario participate in the OTPP, all ministers in the
United Methodist Church participate in the UMC plan, and the Dutch industry wide plans are
typically organized by industry or profession (and cover many or all workers in that industry or
profession the Netherlands). Participants at the 2007 R20/20 conference, which focused on
aligning roles with skills, concluded that having individuals participate in large groups was one
way to reduce the information asymmetry between individuals and markets (individuals who
don’t have expertise in the markets can hire someone who does have market expertise). In
addition, it provides for lower administrative and investment fees (than individual account plans
or smaller pension plans), improved coverage (all employers are in the system) and perfectly
portable benefits (to the extent participants stay within the profession/geographic area). This is
in addition to the benefits of pooling of mortality risk.
Nearly default-free discount rates. Several of these non-traditional plans use discount
rates that are nearly default-free to measure actuarial funded status. For example, in its 2007
valuation the OTPP presents accrued benefits measured with a of 4.65% discount rate, which is
the rate as of January 1, 2007 on long-term Government of Canada real-return bonds plus 50
basis points to reflect the credit risk for the Province of Ontario (OTPP 2008). The Dutch
industry wide plans measure accrued benefits5 on a fair value basis (using default-free rates)
(Ponds and van Riel, 2007).
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Conclusion
The balance between insurance and investment, choice and default, has been tipping
slowly, based on the preferences of employers, for whom the investment/choice model presents
less risk to the business. Individuals have certainly pushed employers in this direction, as the last
two decades of the 20th century saw increasing demand by baby boomers for DC plans, which
coincided with strong equity markets that made DC plans appear to be secure vehicles for
retirement wealth. But is this push for investment over insurance is healthy for the retirement
system as a whole: are the needs of future generations met by having so many individuals create
investment wealth rather than longevity insurance? Both individuals and society have need for
insurance protection; society also faces additional risks if individuals make poor choices.
Employers have played a central role in the system, but the primacy of that role is an
accident of history. Many employers are no longer interested or able to sponsor plans that play
the insurance role; the risk these systems pose to employers, long-term, do not permit them to
sponsor a DB plan. The DC plan is better suited to the employers’ risk needs. But, the DC plan
is not as well suited to the insurance needs of individuals or society. One potential solution is to
take sponsorship of retirement plans that provide insurance type benefits out of the hands of
employers and give them to third parties.
Markets work best when well trained agents approach the markets. Financial markets are
complex; individuals cannot be expected to understand market complexities, and even
individuals with sophisticated knowledge may not want to spend the time making sophisticated
choices. Retirement systems work well that utilize markets without requiring great individual
knowledge or time.
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Our challenge is to design new systems that work on the axes of investment/insurance
and default/choice. A certain degree of default/insurance protection must be provided, to meet
society’s and individual’s needs and risks. Any system must be designed with the proper use of
markets in mind. Moving this design solely out of the employer based system will open up the
possibilities for new creative designs that break out of the DB/DC paradigm.
The Measurement Framework was designed to help us analyze how well particular
retirement designs work in meeting the needs, risks and roles identified in the R20/20 process.
In looking at the traditional DB and DC system, and focusing on three case studies that are
outside this paradigm (OTPP, UMC plan and Dutch industry wide funds) we have highlighted
other features that make these non-traditional designs succeed: strong governance, solidarity
among plan participants, alignment of roles with skills, inclusion of self-adjusting mechanisms,
degree of independence from employers, using the power of groups, and measuring liabilities
using nearly default-free rates. While we have concerns that these designs can sustain significant
demographic, investment or industry shocks, these features may inspire us toward better
retirement systems.
Finally, we cannot forget that the retirement income system does not operate in a
vacuum. Individuals (particularly in the US) face challenges in meeting their health and longterm care needs as well, challenges that can keep them from making the right choices regarding
retirement income. Participants at the first R20/20 conference recognized this and listed needed
improvements in the financing of health and long-term care as key if new retirement systems are
to succeed. Considering changes to the health and long-term care systems are outside the scope
off the R20/20 project, but, more critically, health and long-term care for retirees must be
considered within the context of the larger health care system in the US.
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Appendix I –Retirement 20/20 Overview
Retirement 20/20 is an initiative of the Society of Actuaries’ Pension Section Council to
develop new retirement systems that extend beyond the existing DB/DC paradigm. Initial work
on the initiative began in late 2005. R20/20 has brought actuaries together with attorneys,
economists, employers and other public policy experts from the US and Canada to systematically
explore the fundamental characteristics of a new retirement system. When the initiative started,
it was broadly focused to consider the role of social insurance, employer vehicles (Tier II) and
private savings. As it has evolved, it has focused on new vehicles for Tier II. Over three
conferences participants have discussed the role of social insurance, and whether that needed to
change. Participants have reaffirmed the design of existing social insurance systems in the US
and Canada as the base upon which to build new Tier II designs.
The first conference was in September 2006, with the goal to understand the
fundamentals needed for a successful 21st century retirement system. It introduced the four
stakeholders (society, individual, employers and markets) and asked three questions for each
stakeholder:


Who has what needs?



Who bears what risks?



Who should or could play what roles?
For purposes of the conference (and future conferences) stakeholders were defined as

follows:


Society is society as a whole (all taxpayers and citizens). It includes current and future
generations. Future generations have a stake in the success of the retirement system, because
if the system is not successful, they may have to pay higher taxes (transfer more of their
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income) to retirees. In this framework, government (politicians) is an agent acting on behalf
of taxpayers and citizens (including future generations).


Individuals are the retirement unit: the persons who will be relying on the retirement system
for income during retirement. They face various risks in retirement and need to find ways to
hedge, pool, or bear those risks in retirement.



Markets have two roles. First, it is the market where wealth is accumulated and deaccumulated. Markets also provide opportunities to hedge and pool retirement risks.
Markets include capital markets and insurers and other financial services firms that offer
retirement income or wealth vehicles.



Employers have needs to attract, retain, motivate and eventually to retire individuals.
The 2006 conference report (SOA 2007) outlines the conference findings around needs,

risks and roles for the four stakeholders. Much of the findings from that conference were used in
development of the Measurement Framework. In addition to the specific findings on needs, risks
and roles, six themes emerged from the conference:


Systems should align stakeholders’ roles with their skills



Systems should be designed to self-adjust



Systems should consider new norms for work and retirement and the role of the normative
retirement age.



Systems should be better aligned with markets.



Systems should clarify the role of the employer



Retirement systems will not succeed without improvements in the health and long-term care
systems.
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These themes emerged in discussions that crossed stakeholders, and were seen as
overarching themes that met the needs, risks and role of all stakeholders. The R20/20 initiative
has focused on retirement income; conference reports have noted the importance of
improvements in health and long-term care, but have not specifically addressed these, as they are
outside the scope of the initiative.
The 2007 conference focused on aligning roles with skills for society, employers and
markets. The conference focused on these three stakeholders who support individuals; if the
roles of these supporting stakeholders are aligned, individuals should be better off. The 2007
conference focused on these questions around role definition:


Which stakeholder is best suited to take on what role?



How do you allocate roles based on stakeholder skills?



How do these role assignments affect other stakeholders?
The 2007 conference report outlines detailed findings (SOA 2008). Conference

participants focused on the role of society to provide structure in the system, through consumer
protection, helping individuals make better decisions, and setting guidelines about what ought to
happen. They concluded that society should work toward goals which include some degree of
annuitization (guaranteed lifetime income), helping individuals accumulate retirement wealth
and providing oversight to the system.
Markets were seen to function most efficiently when groups approached the markets,
when well trained agents were properly incentivized, and when some market product offerings
were standardized, but not to the extent that innovation was hampered (conference participants
believed it was important to encourage innovation in hedging and pooling instruments).
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Finally, employers were best utilized if they could play a number of roles within the
system, not just the role of plan sponsor. Opening up the employer role to roles of facilitator
(helping individuals accumulate wealth), educator or trusted advisor, and possible additional
elective roles as purchasing agent, distributor of retirement income and guarantor (similar to the
employer role in the defined benefit system). Opening up the possibilities of the employer role
was seen as critically important.
The 2008 conference focused on several themes that emerged over prior conferences


Changing signals,



Default distribution options,



Self-adjusting mechanisms, and



Market hedging opportunities.
Regarding changing signals, conference participants focused on signals sent within social

insurance (Social Security) regarding retirement ages.
Much of the discussion of default distributions focused on why individuals do not
annuitize, with conference participants reaffirming the need for a minimum level of
annuitization.
The Dutch industry wide design were featured in the discussion on self-adjusting
mechanisms; conference participants focused on the strengths and weaknesses of self-adjusting
mechanisms (including whether all participants had the same desire for risk).
Finally, the question of whether market hedges needed to be introduced before new
retirement systems could be designed was discussed; panelists concluded that market demand
would be necessary to drive the introduction of new hedging instruments (e.g. longevity bonds
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that hedge against systematic mortality improvements). More detail can be found in the 2008
conference report (SOA 2009b, forthcoming).
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Appendix II – About the Measurement Framework
The Measurement Framework was developed as a tool to test how well new designs met
the principles for new retirement systems that were being developed within R20/20. The tool
was to test whether the design aspects met, or appeared to meet, the needs and risks for each
stakeholder, and whether they were best suited to the role identified for that stakeholder. In
addition they looked at four of the cross-stakeholder themes from the 2006 conference: selfadjusting (automatically adjust to changing demographic and economic conditions), align roles
with skills, support new norms for work and retirement, and align with markets.
The framework assesses 34 characteristics for each of the four stakeholders: society (9
characteristics), individuals (11 characteristics), employers (8 characteristics) and markets (6
characteristics). Tables I-IV shows the characteristics and their definitions.
Each characteristic, or criterion, is assigned a rating on a red-yellow-green scale. There
are five color choices: green, yellow-green, yellow, yellow-red and red. The green rating is
highest, suggesting that the plan does as well as can be expected in meeting that need or risk,
while a red rating suggests the plan does extremely poorly in meeting that need or risk. The
ratings are assessed by a team of retirement professionals (actuaries and others) with expertise in
retirement systems.
The ratings for stakeholders are combined to create a composite rating. The composite
rating can blur differences (a plan with a lot of red and a lot of green can score yellow in the
composite rating, as can a plan with a lot of yellow ratings), so the Framework shows color bars
together with the summary rating to show the degree of variation in the ratings across all needs
and risks for that stakeholder.
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In addition to baseline ratings, each characteristic is rated based on the effect of moral
hazard. We recognize that a plan can be designed with one intention, but the actions of agents or
misunderstandings of stakeholders can lead to different (negative) outcomes. For example, plans
that pay benefits in the form of annuities score highly for individuals along the “guaranteed
income” criteria; the presence of a lump sum option represents a moral hazard for the individual,
which would lower that score. Each category shows scores for both the individual characteristic
and that characteristic considering moral hazard.
Figures I and II show a sample page for Individuals with ratings for four characteristics
(guaranteed income, predictability of income, retirement flexibility and portability) for a
traditional single-employer DB and single-employer DC plan, respectively. Figure III shows the
sample summary chart for individuals for a defined benefit plan, with ratings annotated.
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Appendix III – Summary of Non-traditional Plans
Ontario Teachers Pension Plan (OTPP). OTPP covers all non-university teachers, in
public and certain private schools, and those who work in certain teaching related organizations
in the province of Ontario. As of 31 December 2007 the plan had $CN 108.5 billion in assets
and $CN 115.4 in liabilities (on an accrued benefits basis) (OTPP 2008). The plan is jointly
sponsored by the Ontario Ministry of Education and the Ontario Teachers Federation. The plan
is an independent corporation, with a board of directors appointed jointly by the Ontario Ministry
of Education and Ontario Teachers Federation.
Benefits are 2% per year of service multiplied by final (five year) average salary. The
benefit is integrated with the Canada Pension Plan (CPP – Canadian social insurance). Benefits
are fully inflation indexed, and are payable to members and survivors as life annuities. Only
accrued benefits are protected (the plan may change the plan formula for future service).
Teachers and the government of Ontario (with small amounts from other employers) each
fund half the cost of the plan (in 2007 teachers paid $CN 1,040 million, the Ontario government
$CN 1,060 million and other employers/transfers from other plans $CN 38 million). For 2009,
employee contributions are 10.4% up to the Canadian Pension Plan (CPP) Maximum
Pensionable Earnings limit ($CN 46,300) and 12.0% over the CPP limit; employer contributions
are equal to employee contributions (OTPP 2008).
The OTPP is an independent corporation. It is managed by a Board with members
nominated equally by the Ontario Teachers’ Federation (OTF) and the Ontario Ministry of
Education. They jointly set benefit levels, contribution rates for teachers (which are matched by
the government and other employers) and how any shortfalls or surpluses are addressed. Board
members are retirement professionals appointed by the OTF and Ministry of Education (the OTF
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may appoint one teacher). Each group appoints four board members, and the board members
jointly appoint their own chair.
The plan was recently updated to modify the inflation index to make 50% of the inflation
increase conditional on fund performance, longevity improvements and other factors. In any
year where the full inflation increase is not provided, the government and other employers will
contribute the amount foregone as an additional contribution (to maintain the 50/50 cost sharing
in the plan).
Dutch industry wide plans. Plans are typically collective funds, organized either by
occupation or industry. They are designed to be self-sustaining. All employees are expected to
join a fund, and all workers should have access to a fund. Almost all industries or occupations
have these plans; there are a few private DB plans left but most individuals participate in these
funds6.
Benefits are typically career pay with accruals of 2% per year or higher, and are generally
integrated with social insurance. A fixed benefit, generally the career pay benefit without
indexation, is guaranteed. Indexation on the career pay benefits is made conditional to
performance of the fund. The fund can “make up” past foregone indexation if superior funding
levels achieved.

For example, the plan may provide no indexation for a funding level below

85%, partial indexation for funding levels between 85 and 10%, full indexation for funding
levels at 105% and above and backlog indexation starts at funding levels of 125% (From Policy
Ladder Example, Box 4.1, Kakes and Broeders 2006).
Post-retirement indexation is also conditional on performance of the funds. Plans
generally use the same or similar policy assumptions as for pre-retirement indexation.
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Contributions also typically vary based on the targeted funding level; if the fund falls
below that level contributions are increased gradually; at higher levels contributions are reduced.
Certain boundaries are defined by law (e.g. employers and participants must pay actuarial
premium if funding level is at or below 140%).
Pension funds are generally invested in equities but measurements are at market rates.
Typical fund mix might be 50% equities, 50% bonds (Ponds and van Riel 2007)
UMC Plan. The Clergy Retirement Security Program of the United Methodist Church
(UMC Plan) is a church-sponsored plan. It has both a DB and DC component; we will only
cover the DB component. Clergy have access to Social Security benefits (unless they decide, as
individuals, to opt out).
The UMC General Board of Pensions makes investment decisions, sets contribution
levels and makes recommendations to the convention. Most of the Board is elected from the
general membership but a few positions are appointed based on expertise. There are additional
ad-hoc members, appointed for the expertise, who serve on Board committees.
Participation is mandatory for all regional conferences (regional groupings of local
churches, roughly akin to states; there are 63). Regional conferences do not control benefit
design, investment policy, or aggregate contribution levels. Plan changes can only be made at
convention by an elected committee of 1,000 delegates that meets for two weeks once every four
years. By definition, half of the delegates are clergy. That committee makes all decisions that
are made on behalf of the worldwide and/or national church.
Benefits are 1.25% times final denominational average compensation for each year of
service. Joint and survivor benefits are fully subsidized. Subsidized early retirement is available
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after 40 years of service. Benefits are inflation indexed post-retirement. There is a maximum
retirement age of 72. Lump sums are not available.
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Endnotes

1

In general, participants preferred whatever type of plan they had. When asked which type of plan they

preferred (DB or DC) a majority of workers with a DC plan said they prefer a DC plan (62%) while a majority of
workers with a DB plan said they preferred a DB plan (51%); workers who were offered both types of plan were
split between their preference for DC (41%) and DB (37%). However, the preference for a DB plan was strongly
influenced by preferences of government workers (64% of government workers prefer a DB plan; of nongovernment workers with a DB plan, 44% prefer a DB plan and 39% prefer a DC plan). As age increases,
preferences for a DB plan increased sharply (40% of workers age 50 or older expressed a preference for a DB plan,
versus 31% of workers age 40-49 and 20% of workers younger than age 40). Within the survey, only a small
percentage of workers (13%) expressed no preference for DB or DC.
2

Cohort mortality risk is defined as the risk that mortality will improve (decline) or worsen (increase) for

an entire generation. This risk cannot be hedged by pooling; pooling can only hedge the risk that an individual’s
mortality experience will be different from the average expected mortality experience.
3

The TIAA plan is a variable annuity plan. Corporate single-employer sponsored plans can currently offer

this variable annuity design; it does not have be done through a third party, although it works well for a third party
because contributions are fixed.
4

The goal of Retirement 20/20 is to look for models that evolve beyond the traditional employer sponsored

DB/DC system. The initiative has focused on studying models that are outside that system; this does not imply that
there are not strong examples of employer sponsored DB or DC plans.
5

Accrued benefits are measured both with future inflation indexation (pre-and post-retirement) and without

future indexation. The different measures are used for different purposes in the policy ladder.
6

Plans may be organized by single employers; in 2005 14.5% of active participants were in company

pension plans, compared to 84.8% in industry-wide plans (Ponds and van Riel 2007).
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Table I – Society
Measurement Framework Criteria
Criteria

Definition

Adequate

Protects vulnerable citizens.

Affordable

Does not take resources from other social needs. Ensures risk pooling done efficiently.

Sustainable

Sustainable across and within generations. Equitable across and within generations.

Robust

Fair, covers great majority, creates shared economic growth, avoids adverse incentives

Does not promote
economic risk

Efficiently allocates resources and encourages labor force participation.

Does not promote
political risk

Promotes fiscal/political integrity and political stability.

Does not lead to system
failure

Withstands shocks, not prone to instability or adverse incentives.

Addresses imperfections
of other stakeholders

Promotes strong individual decision making and covers lack of market instruments.

Promote social solidarity Ensures basic standards of living; ensures risks are shared.
and integrity
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Table II – Individuals
Measurement Framework Criteria
Criteria

Definition

Guaranteed income

Provides substantial level of income protection.

Predictability of income

Facilitates retirement planning.

Retirement flexibility

Allows choice of retirement age, including possibility to phase into retirement.

Portability

Minimizes loss upon employment termination.

Sensitive to employment
conditions

Benefits may vary in line with employment conditions.

Sensitive to family needs

Benefits may vary in line with spousal and children needs.

Requirement for individual
skills

Level of knowledge required to plan for retirement.

Investment risk

Protects against fluctuations in market returns.

Longevity risk

Protects against possibility to outlive assets.

Inflation risk

Includes both pre and post retirement inflation.

Premature retirement risk

Protects against forced early retirement due to disability, family circumstances, and involuntary
termination.
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Table III – Employers
Measurement Framework Criteria
Criteria

Definition

Supports primary business
purpose

Enhances core purpose of the employer’s business.

Workforce management:
attraction & retention

Enhances business value by allowing attraction and retention of the “right employees”.

Workforce management:
transition of employees

Enhances business value by facilitating the orderly transition of employees.

Responsive to owners

Responds to needs of owners, e.g., shareholders for public companies, which may limit amount of risk
to be taken.

Business risk

Ability to react quickly to changes in the competitive landscape.

Regulatory risk

Allows plan to be operated to fit needs and change to meet conditions easily within regulatory
framework.

Fiduciary risk

Allows plan to be easily operated to minimize fiduciary liability.

Litigation risk

Allows management of workforce to avoid lawsuits.
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Table IV – Markets
Measurement Framework Criteria
Criteria

Definition

Maximizes use of markets

Effectively uses markets and hedging mechanisms; stakeholders can purchase hedging instruments
cost effectively.

Transparent (cost)

Costs of plan are transparent (fees, costs to sponsors, other stakeholders, etc).

Strong Governance

Fiduciary roles of plan sponsors well defined. Plan structure minimizes agency issues, particularly
regarding plan investment and risk taking.

Efficiently priced

Market price is well understood and accepted by stakeholders. Plan does not contain features which
cannot be efficiently priced.
Plans incorporate discipline in pricing.

Efficient risk bearing

Plan efficiently pools idiosyncratic risks and hedges systematic risks (both economic and
demographic).

Allocation of risk

Plan efficiently allocates risk across stakeholders, giving each stakeholder the risk he can best bear.
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Figure I
Sample Measurement Framework Page, Individual criteria, DB framework
Traditional Final Pay DB Plan (single employer, corporate sponsored)
Individual’s Needs & Risks (Composite Rating (Yellow-green))
Criteria

Objective

Rating

Evaluation

Effect of adverse incentives

Guaranteed
income

Provides substantial
level of income
protection.

Yellow
-Green

Benefit promise is well defined and
based on final pay (income security).
For short service employees, benefits
are often quite small and not related
to final pay at retirement.

If plan terminates not fully funded,
individuals close to or even in
retirement can lose some benefits;
presence of a government guaranty
program could encourage employers
to cease funding in financial distress
situations. (Red)

Predictability
of income

Facilitates retirement
planning.

Green

Fixed promise allows for retirement
planning.

If plan terminates not fully funded,
participants can lose some benefits;
existence of a government guaranty
program can offset some risk but may
encourage employers in financial
distress to underfund plan. (Red)

Retirement
flexibility

Allows choice of
retirement age,
including possibility to
phase into retirement.

Yellow

Ability to choose retirement age, but
individuals may not understand how
promise changes with retirement age;
may not be able to phase into
retirement with partial benefits.

Early retirement reductions, while
actuarially sound, are not easy to
understand and can be perceived as
unfair by employees, causing them to
devalue the plan. (Red-Yellow)

Portability

Minimizes loss upon
employment
termination.

RedYellow

Final pay formula creates very small
benefits for those who leave preretirement.

Lump sums can further expose
leakage issues encouraging people to
spend what seem to be small lump
sums on non-retirement needs.
(Red-Yellow)

Source (SOA 2009a, forthcoming) (modified for black and white reproduction).
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Figure II
Sample Measurement Framework Page, Individual criteria, DC framework
Traditional DC Plan (corporate sponsor, single employer)
Individual’s Needs & Risks (Composite rating: (Yellow) )
Criteria

Objective

Rating

Guaranteed
income

Provides substantial
level of income
protection.

Yellow

Predictability
of income

Facilitates retirement
planning.

RedYellow

Retirement
flexibility

Allows choice of
retirement age,
including possibility to
phase into retirement.

Green

Portability

Minimizes loss upon
employment
termination.

Green

Evaluation

Effect of adverse incentives

Cumbersome and expensive for
individuals to convert account
balances to guaranteed income;
conversion can also have negative
tax consequences

Individuals may be sold products that
provide unneeded features, or that do
not provide true longevity guarantee.
Cost of conversion at an individual
rather than group rate harmful for less
wealthy individuals with small account
balances. (Red-yellow)

Works better for wealthier rather than
less wealthy individuals (who can
afford professional advice). Difficult
to manage and understand value of
account balance, particularly small
balances.

Moral hazard not significant.
yellow)

Unrestricted ability to choose
retirement age.

No protection for individuals who find
they might have to retire early due to
disability or other impairment.
(Yellow)

Perfect portability

Leakage is common, as participants
take small account balances in cash
on termination. (Yellow)

Source (SOA 2009a, forthcoming) (modified for black and white reproduction).

(Red-
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Figure III
Summary chart for Society stakeholder, Traditional DB Plan

The average rating of
yellow-green is a
composite of the nine
society subcategories.

Society
(composite
rating)

Meets society’s needs
and risks.

The ratings for the nine-subcategories
are shown in the color line. They are
color grouped so you can see how
many of each rating were received. (1)

Yellow

Individual criteria ratings:

Ratings for each subcategory were adjusted
for the effects of adverse incentives. This
shows the new color line after adverse
incentives are considered as well as a new
composite rating. (2)

Adjusted composite rating:
Ratings after adverse incentives:

Plans protect long-service workers
well (less so short-service workers)
avoiding the need for more
government sponsored benefits.

System depends on employer
paternalism, and employer adverse
incentives require government
regulation, which destabilizes system.

Source (SOA 2009a, forthcoming) (modified for black and white reproduction).
(1) The color line shows ratings in green/yellow-green/yellow/red-yellow/red order. In this color line, there are two green, four yellow-green, two
yellow and one red rating.
(2) The adjusted composite rating is yellow. The color line shows the adjusted ratings in green/yellow-green/yellow/red-yellow/red order. In this
color line, there are three yellow-green, two yellow, three red-yellow and one red rating.

